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Abstract 
In The Empathy Exams Leslie Jamison offers an unusual perspective: ‘Empathy isn’t just something that 
happens to us – a meteor shower of synapses firing across the brain – it’s also a choice we make: to pay 
attention, to extend ourselves. It’s made of exertion, that dowdier cousin of impulse’ (23). This essay is 
dedicated to elaborating that crucial observation. A vast amount of recent research concerns empathy – 
in evolutionary biology, neurobiology, moral psychology, and ethics. I want to extend these investigations 
by exploring the degree to which individuals can control our empathy: for whom and what we feel it, to 
what degree, in what circumstances, and with what practical results. My inquiry is aimed toward showing 
that humans can find ways to empathize with non-human animals – a capacity that is manifest in our 
relations with animal companions, but more rarely exercised when we consider animal victims of human 
exploitation. I introduce the notion of moral laziness: aversion to and avoidance of moral efforts and 
exertion. The foundation of this failing is often empathic laziness: aversion to imagining the mental states 
of others, feeling congruent emotions, and experiencing the impulse to help that empathy arouses. This is 
a serious moral failing because it enables continuing complicity in animal abuse and undermines 
integrity. Jamison remarks in relation to empathy, ‘I believe in intention and I believe in work. I believe in 
waking up in the middle of the night and packing our bags and leaving our worst selves for our better 
ones’ (23-24). I offer practical suggestions for that work. 
Keywords 
activism, an imals, attention, emotion, empathy, ethics, imagination, laziness, morality, self - improvement, 
self - transformation, sloth 
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Abstract: In The Empathy Exams Leslie Jamison offers an unusual perspective: ‘Empathy isn’t just 
something that happens to us – a meteor shower of synapses firing across the brain – it’s also a 
choice we make: to pay attention, to extend ourselves. It’s made of exertion, that dowdier cousin of 
impulse’ (23). This essay is dedicated to elaborating that crucial observation. 
 A vast amount of recent research concerns empathy – in evolutionary biology, 
neurobiology, moral psychology, and ethics. I want to extend these investigations by exploring the 
degree to which individuals can control our empathy: for whom and what we feel it, to what degree, 
in what circumstances, and with what practical results.  My inquiry is aimed toward showing that 
humans can find ways to empathize with non-human animals – a capacity that is manifest in our 
relations with animal companions, but more rarely exercised when we consider animal victims of 
human exploitation.  
 I introduce the notion of moral laziness: aversion to and avoidance of moral efforts and 
exertion. The foundation of this failing is often empathic laziness: aversion to imagining the mental 
states of others, feeling congruent emotions, and experiencing the impulse to help that empathy 
arouses. This is a serious moral failing because it enables continuing complicity in animal abuse and 
undermines integrity. 
 Jamison remarks in relation to empathy, ‘I believe in intention and I believe in work. I 
believe in waking up in the middle of the night and packing our bags and leaving our worst selves for 
our better ones’ (23-24). I offer practical suggestions for that work.  
Keywords: activism, animals, attention, emotion, empathy, ethics, imagination, laziness, morality, 
self-improvement, self-transformation, sloth   
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Empathy isn’t just something that happens to us – a meteor shower of 
synapses firing across the brain – it’s also a choice we make: to pay 
attention, to extend ourselves. It’s made of exertion, that dowdier cousin of 
impulse. (Leslie Jamison, The Empathy Exams, 23)  
 
Introduction 
 
A vast amount of recent research concerns empathy – in evolutionary biology, neurobiology, 
moral psychology, and ethics. Much is being learned about the evolutionary origins of our 
capacity for empathy, the brain structures and events that make it possible, and what authentic 
empathy involves. I want to extend these investigations by exploring the degree to which 
individuals have control over empathy: for whom and what we feel it, to what degree, in what 
circumstances, and with what practical results. My inquiry is aimed toward showing that humans 
can find ways to empathize with non-human animals – a capacity that is manifest in our relations 
with beloved animal companions, but more rarely exercised when we consider animal victims of 
human exploitation.  
I will introduce the notion of moral laziness, a vice distinct from weakness of will and 
other failings, to prepare the way for exploring empathic self-improvement. As Jamison puts it, 
‘I believe in intention and I believe in work. I believe in waking up in the middle of the night and 
packing our bags and leaving our worst selves for our better ones’ (23-24). I’d like to offer 
practical suggestions for that work.   
Beyond moral self-improvement and the cultivation of virtue, this project has important 
implications for animal activism. Tremendous energy has been devoted to considering human 
obligations to nonhuman animals, both in scholarly circles and in public life. This attention has 
taken two distinct but overlapping tracks corresponding to those disparate contexts: (a) the 
development of rationally defended theories of the moral status of animals and (b) exposure and 
attention to the treatment of animals in large-scale industries. Some authors, most notably Peter 
Singer, have succeeded admirably in accomplishing both. While both activities have been crucial 
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in promoting better practices, I would argue that the latter has played the more essential role in 
the lives of ordinary people. When people learn of the brutal treatment of exploited animals, 
ordinary empathy and compassion move many to change their practices.   
 Still, many who are empathic toward humans and ‘companion animals’ such as cats and 
dogs fail to empathize with the animals most brutally abused in contemporary life such as 
chickens, cows, and pigs. Empathy with farmed animals, observed in many children, seems to be 
radically attenuated – squelched and ‘tracked’ into appropriate channels – by the onset of 
adulthood. How can we enhance empathy for exploited animals in ways that foster individual 
and social change? In focusing on choice, attention, and work, Jamison has identified a 
dimension of empathy often ignored by scholars and activists – one that we must recognize and 
engage to make a better world for animals. 
 
What is Empathy? 
 
The term ‘empathy’ is used to designate a wide variety of phenomena ‘that vary, sometimes 
widely, in their function, phenomenology, mechanisms, and effects’ (Coplan, ‘Real Empathy’ 
41). There is no single, agreed-upon conception of empathy across disciplines and viewpoints, 
or even within a given discipline such as philosophy. As Amy Coplan notes, this is not a problem 
in itself: our everyday use of the term is ‘highly varied, and often quite vague;’ and it would not 
be useful or wise to try to ‘regiment the term into one single meaning’ (Empathy xxxi). What is 
necessary is that one make clear one’s own conception of empathy in offering claims and 
arguments.  
Coplan sets out to specify what is involved in various phenomena called empathy so that 
we can ‘appreciate more fully the roles these processes play in our lives’ (‘Real Empathy’ 43). 
She focuses on three processes commonly called ‘empathy’: emotional contagion, self-oriented 
perspective taking, and empathy proper (‘Real Empathy’ 44). I will employ her exposition here 
to make clear what sense of empathy I have in mind in my discussion. 
 Psychologists define emotional contagion as the ‘tendency to automatically mimic and 
synchronize expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements with those of another person, 
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and, consequently, to converge emotionally’ (Hatfield et al. 153-4). This typically happens 
‘below the threshold of awareness,’ so that we ‘catch’ another’s emotion without realizing it.  
Through automatic ‘facial, vocal, and postural mimicry,’ we come to feel the emotions of others 
around us. This automatic process seems to be what David Hume meant by ‘sympathy.’ Hume 
noted our natural propensity ‘to receive by communication [others’] inclinations and 
sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own’ (317). He observed that 
when we encounter another person experiencing an emotion, we know this through ‘those 
external signs in the countenance and conversation’ that give us an idea of it; this idea is then 
converted by sympathy into an ‘impression,’ which becomes the very passion or emotion itself 
(317). This process is automatic and involuntary, so there is no ‘cognitive evaluation or 
interpretation’ of another’s emotions (Coplan, ‘Real Empathy’ 45). No effort, imagination, or 
thought are involved, and emotional contagion ‘transmits no understanding’ of another’s 
feelings. For these reasons, we will not be concerned with it here. 
 Coplan describes self-oriented perspective-taking as ‘an attempt to adopt a target 
individual’s perspective by imagining how we ourselves would think, feel, and desire if we were 
in the target individual’s position’ (‘Real Empathy’ 54).  This is the concept of ‘sympathy’ of 
Adam Smith, who revised Hume’s conception and made it the foundation of his moral theory.  
For Smith, sympathy involved imaginative perspective-taking: 
By the imagination we place ourselves in [another’s] situation, we conceive ourselves 
enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some 
measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and 
even feel something, which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. (9) 
Smith’s conception of sympathy differs significantly from Hume’s: while Hume describes an 
involuntary, nearly instantaneous emotional contagion, Smith’s focus is on a higher-level process 
involving deliberate use of our imagination (Coplan, Empathy xi). Coplan notes that Smith 
sometimes describes an observer ‘imagining what she herself would feel in the target individual’s 
situation’ and sometimes describes the observer ‘attempting to imagine being the target in the 
target’s situation’ (xi). 
Coplan calls the former phenomenon ‘pseudo-empathy’ because although it can provide 
some understanding of others’ experiences, ‘one individual’s response to a set of circumstances 
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is rarely a reliable indicator of what another’s will be’ (‘Real Empathy’ 54). We are subject to 
‘egocentric bias’ that assumes greater similarity between ourselves and another than typically 
exists, so that we often mistakenly conclude that others feel, think, and want the same things as 
ourselves (56). Thus ‘people often mistakenly believe that [self-oriented perspective-taking] 
provides them with access to the other’s point of view when it does not’ (56). 
In other-oriented perspective-taking, or genuine empathy, ‘a person represents the 
other’s situation from the other person’s point of view and attempts to simulate the target 
individual’s experiences as though she were the target individual’ (Coplan, ‘Real Empathy’ 54). 
One brings to the perspective-taking effort the other’s ‘character, emotions, moods, 
dispositional tendencies, and life experiences’ (54).   
 Assuming that empathy is important for interpersonal understanding and moral 
responses to others, Coplan asks what we should do when we lack the knowledge to engage in 
other-oriented perspective taking:    
Would it be better in such cases to engage in self-oriented perspective taking? My 
answer is ‘no.’ We are better off recognizing that we are sometimes incapable of 
genuine empathy, rather than making the assumption that we know what the other is 
going through just because we know what we would be going through in some similar 
situation. (‘Real Empathy’ 56) 
I disagree with Coplan here. We can be aware that we will never fully understand what another 
is going through, yet get closer to such understanding through self-oriented perspective-taking. 
Surely this is better than no perspective-taking at all. This is important not just in human 
interactions (for example, attempting to empathize with victims of racism or Holocaust 
survivors even when one can never fully experience what they have), but also (especially) when 
we observe other animals who are suffering. We can never experience precisely what it is like to 
be a sow confined in a gestation crate, a debeaked chicken painfully trying to eat, or a cow hung 
upside down and bleeding out. We can form an imaginative sense of how awful such things 
would feel to us, however, and still focus our attention on the other animal.  
 Coplan acknowledges that ‘pseudo-empathy’ is often a good thing, and certainly ‘far 
better than experiencing the other in purely instrumental terms’  (57). It is often motivated by 
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concern for the other and a desire to understand his experiences, and it ‘may also be the path by 
which we learn to engage in other-oriented perspective taking’ (57). But for her it is not full-
blown empathy, in which (insofar as we are able) we imaginatively take the other’s perspective 
and (attempt to) feel as they do.  
 Coplan defines empathy proper as a complex imaginative process ‘through which an 
observer simulates another’s situated psychological states, while maintaining clear self-other 
differentiation’ (‘Real Empathy’ 58). She notes that it is ‘difficult to achieve’ (58). Staying 
focused on the target and moving beyond our own experiences requires mental flexibility and 
suppressing our own perspectives when necessary.  When someone is very different from 
ourselves, these things are particularly difficult: ‘the more unlike a target we are, the more 
difficult it is to reconstruct her subjective experiences’ (58). In these cases, ‘we must work 
harder,’ and still may not succeed. For Coplan, empathy is ‘a motivated and controlled process, 
which is neither automatic nor involuntary and demands that the observer attend to relevant 
differences between self and other’ (59).  
 Meghan Masto agrees with Coplan that emotional contagion does not count as empathy; 
that genuine empathy requires ‘some kind of cognitive effort’ and is a voluntary process (77). 
Masto is less concerned, however, with Coplan’s distinction between self- and other-oriented 
perspective-taking. Masto proposes the following conception of empathy:  
when one empathizes, one comes to share a relevantly similar affective state with the 
target of empathy because one has imagined oneself in the other’s position, and one 
forms some relevant true beliefs regarding the psychological state of the target at least in 
part on the basis of the perspective-taking process. (76-7) 
While an exact match of affect is too strict a requirement, empathy does require that one 
‘experience an affective state that is “in the same neighborhood” as the target’s’ (77). One 
experiences this ‘because one has imagined oneself in the other’s position’ (76). Although a 
relevant true belief about the other ‘may simply be the belief that the target is feeling similarly 
to the way in which the agent feels,’ in other cases forming true beliefs about the other’s state 
‘may involve further beliefs about the target’s beliefs, desires, emotions, and other mental 
states’ (77).   
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 I find Masto’s expression of what empathy involves more illuminating than Coplan’s. 
The term ‘simulate’ can connote a kind of conscious imitation; thus Coplan’s reference to the 
empathizer ‘simulating’ others’ mental states may inadvertently suggest something less direct or 
immediate than what empathy ordinarily involves. Masto’s formulation is clearer: in empathy 
we ‘come to share a relevantly similar affective state with the target’ (76) as a result of an 
imaginative exercise, while maintaining (as Coplan notes) a clear distinction between ourselves 
and the target.    
Some authors include in empathy an urge to help the other: an action-guiding impulse. 
Roman Krznaric defines empathy as ‘the art of stepping imaginatively into the shoes of another 
person, understanding their feelings and perspectives, and using that understanding to guide 
your actions’ (x, my emphasis). Jean Decety defines it as ‘[t]he natural capacity to share, 
understand, and respond with care to the affective states of others’ (vii, my emphasis). Lori 
Gruen defines empathy as ‘a type of caring perception’ focused on another’s experience’ (3, my 
emphasis). Heidi Maibom argues that in vicariously feeling what others feel, ‘we directly come 
to be motivated by their projects and concerns’ (161). 
For these authors, empathy includes a cognitive, an affective, and a motivational 
dimension. The last element is somewhat controversial.  Some have noted that sociopaths can 
use empathic knowledge – an understanding of what another feels – to increase the other’s 
suffering.1 Even in the non-sociopathic, empathy certainly does not always lead to caring action. 
Kaplan and others have observed that empathic distress and even vicarious trauma can occur to 
those looking at images of horrible suffering. In those cases, ‘the original empathic impulse to 
help turns back on the viewer or listener because the shock is too much; it overwhelms and 
freezes the subject’ (Kaplan 260). As Masto puts it, ‘in some instances empathizing can 
overwhelm an agent into inaction’ (79). Others have noted that empathic distress leads some to 
escape by leaving the scene or turning away from images that arouse empathy, rather than 
                                                     
 
 
1 See, for example, Goldie. 
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helping.2 This is borne out by the experience of teachers in animal studies: some students are so 
upset by images of animal suffering that they deliberately avoid them, or react by leaving the 
room (along with serious contemplation of the subject).  But even here, note that it is an 
‘original … impulse to help’ that ends up overwhelming subjects into inaction. This would 
suggest that a motivational element is normally present in empathy, but that it can be so 
threatening or disturbing that traumatized viewers short-circuit the urge to help that empathy 
arouses by diverting their attention from the source of empathic distress. 
Whether or not we define empathy as including an urge to alleviate another’s distress 
will not materially affect my discussion; for ordinary agents know very well that empathy at least 
normally leads to, or brings in its wake, a powerful impulse to help. That alone will prove 
enough to help explain – and make problematic – the empathic laziness discussed below.   
In addition to a clear conception of what we mean by it, it seems important to note the 
phenomenology of ordinary empathy. Dan Zahavi and Soren Overgaard do so particularly well, 
characterizing empathy as our ability to access the life of the mind of others via their bodily and 
behavioral expressions, so as to gain ‘a direct, noninferential, (quasi)-perceptual awareness of 
another’s emotions, sensations, or other psychological states’  (8-10). Similarly, Elisa Aaltola 
defines empathy as a method of understanding others through which we gain ‘an experienced 
insight into the mental contents of others’ (462, original emphasis). Carl Rogers, founder of 
humanistic psychology, wrote that when we empathize with another, we are ‘entering the 
private world of the other … temporarily living in his/her life’ (4).   
While these authors recognize empathy as a natural human capacity, many also highlight 
its nature as an ‘art’ (Krznaric), a ‘method’ (Aaltola), a ‘process’ (Coplan, ‘Real Empathy’), or 
an activity of ‘think[ing] and feel[ing] oneself into the inner life of another’ (Kohut). In this they 
acknowledge that we can exercise a measure of control over our ability to empathize, and 
become better or worse at it. While the ultimate awareness of others’ feelings may be a directly 
                                                     
 
 
2 See, for example, Eisenberg, et al. 
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experienced insight, the exercise of imaginative capacities to attain that insight is something we 
can direct and control.   
My conception of empathy draws from Aaltola and Masto, for I think they best capture a 
widely shared understanding of the term. I mean by empathy a natural capacity for (and the 
activity of) coming to share a relevantly similar affective state with another because one has 
attended to the other and imagined being in the other’s position. While this can happen as a 
result of reading about others’ experiences, its most powerful manifestations come as a result of 
attending to another’s ‘bodily and behavioral expressions.’ While empathy often brings in its 
wake an action-guiding impulse, we do not need to include that impulse in the definition of 
empathy itself.  For a conception of empathic laziness, it is enough to note that ordinary agents 
know very well, from direct experience, empathy’s power to arouse in us the impulse to help.  
 
Empathy’s Role in Moral Life 
 
Jesse Prinz argues against empathy’s importance in moral life, declaring that it is ‘not a 
component, a necessary cause, a reliable epistemic guide, a foundation for justification, or the 
motivating force behind our moral judgments’ (214). In fact, he argues, ‘empathy is, by and 
large, bad for morality’ (216). If Prinz is right, empathic laziness need not be a moral concern. 
In fact, given what Prinz calls the ‘dark side’ of empathy, empathic laziness might indeed be a 
good thing. 
Responding directly to Prinz, Meghan Masto argues that:  
empathy is sometimes epistemologically necessary for identifying the right action, …  
sometimes psychologically necessary for motivating the agent to perform the right 
action, and  … sometimes necessary for the agent to be most morally praiseworthy for 
an action . (74)   
To highlight the importance of empathic laziness, I will review this important debate, noting in 
advance that I come down squarely on the side of Masto. 
 As Prinz recognizes, one might argue that empathy plays a crucial epistemic role in 
moral judgment: ‘By seeing that an action has caused joy, we are led to recognize that it 
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warrants praise, and by seeing that an action has caused suffering, we recognize that it warrants 
blame’ (222). Empathy seems necessary for us to perceive ‘the affective benefits and costs of 
human conduct’ (222). 
 Prinz acknowledges that in this way empathy ‘sometimes leads us to see good and bad 
actions whose status we might have otherwise missed’ (223). Yet he insists that empathy plays 
this role only contingently and that it is ‘epistemically unreliable’ (223). There are other ways to 
know another’s state of mind than by coming to share it through empathy; we can recognize 
distress without feeling congruent distress. In fact, sometimes (as noted above) vicarious distress 
interferes with attention to others and helping: a person may simply withdraw to avoid empathic 
distress, or become ‘defensive and accusatory’ (223). A better alternative, for Prinz, is to 
register another’s suffering ‘dispassionately’ and thus more clearly judge whether it is ‘an 
appropriate object of moral concern’ (223).  
Masto’s rejoinder is that everyday moral decisions are often difficult because it is 
unclear how those involved will be affected by our choices. ‘What should I say to a friend who 
has just lost her spouse? Am I obligated to leave my job so that my partner can accept his dream 
job across the country?’ (83) In these cases:  
empathizing with others can help us be more informed and thus … make it more likely 
that we will do the right thing. In fact, empathizing is sometimes necessary for getting 
the information necessary for knowing … which act is morally right. (83)  
Sometimes, we could not have grasped relevant information about how others will suffer or 
benefit as a result of our actions without having shifted our perspective in this way. In these cases 
‘empathy is epistemically necessary for identifying the right action’ (85). Lori Gruen agrees, 
noting that the information gained through empathy often ‘alters what is salient about the 
situation’ (41). As a form of moral perception that helps us to see what is relevant and important 
in a particular context, ‘empathetic moral perception guides us to perceive a situation more 
accurately…’ (42). 
Masto acknowledges that sometimes we can gather relevant information by other 
means; but even in those cases, knowledge we gain from empathizing is ‘a richer, deeper kind of 
information’– namely, knowledge of  ‘how it feels to feel like that’ – that is sometimes vital to 
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recognizing an action as the right one (84). This is vividly exemplified in animal ethics 
education. As teachers attest, empathizing (not just knowing the facts) is often necessary for 
students to grasp the situation of exploited animals in the ‘richer, deeper’ way that reveals the 
full horror of factory farming and other practices. 
Is empathy needed to motivate moral action?  Prinz is skeptical, citing studies showing 
that ‘empathy promotes prosocial behavior but only when there is little or no cost’ (225). Other 
research seems to show that empathy does motivate helping behavior at high personal cost; but 
Prinz is doubtful that it is just empathy that does the motivating, or that empathy is necessary at 
all (either in the laboratory or in the outside world). He notes that research subjects may have ‘a 
complex motivational state that involves … anticipatory guilt, if they do not help; reward, if 
they do help; and empathy’ (226). Empathy manipulations in the lab may ‘increase the salience 
of suffering in a way that promotes these other emotions … and they [rather than just empathy] 
may drive the motivational effect’ (226).  
I share Gruen’s skepticism about whether laboratory experiments illuminate agents’ 
conduct in everyday life (54-5). But taking these studies on their own terms, why would 
‘anticipatory guilt’ or psychological reward be present at all, in the absence of empathy?  
Further, why assume that empathy is never necessary to motivate moral action?  Introspection 
and self-reports strongly suggest otherwise. Even when we know the right thing to do, we often 
struggle to actually do it.  Masto notes that in such cases we need to take the perspective of 
another so that we can feel as he is feeling. This perspective is sometimes necessary ‘for 
motivating us to do the thing that we know we should do’  (91). 
Finally, Masto observes that ‘doing the right thing is not all that matters’ in moral life; 
we also want agents to be moved by morally appropriate reasons  (91).  Empathy enables us to 
act on the basis of deeply felt concern for another’s well-being. Even if we could condition 
ourselves and others to act well without empathy, as Prinz suggests we can, ‘we would still 
suffer a moral deficiency’ (90). Agents who do the right things merely because they have been 
conditioned to do so ‘hardly seem praiseworthy for doing so’ (90). Even those who do the right 
thing out of respect for a moral principle or a Kantian sense of duty often seem less praiseworthy 
than those who are moved to act by empathy. Thus, even if it is not always needed for correct 
moral judgment or moral motivation, empathy is a highly valuable capacity and state of mind. 
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Prinz doubts even this, noting the ‘dark side’ of empathy (229). Like others, he 
observes that empathy varies as a function of ‘social proximity and salience’; we empathize less 
with strangers or distant others than we do with those who are like us or close by (224). Also, 
empathy can lead us to ignore ‘more important criteria of blame’; sometimes the right action 
will lead others to suffer. Hence we ‘cannot rely on empathy as an epistemic guide’ (224). 
While useful as a heuristic, ‘empathy is dangerously error prone when it comes to determining 
the scope of appropriate moral concern’ (224); thus, when we use empathy as a guide to right 
action, we risk ‘profound moral error’ (224). Empathy is easily manipulated, partial to those 
more like us, likely to lead to unfair decisions, and (in general) an unreliable guide to right 
action. Prinz cites a salient example:   
[T]here is no way to cultivate empathy for every person in need, and the focus on 
affected individuals distracts us from systemic problems that can be addressed only by 
interventions at an entirely different scale. Empathy is ineluctably local… With 
empathy, we ignore the forest fire, while watering a smoldering tree. (228) 
Prinz doubts even the expected rejoinder that ‘attention to the individual can be used as 
a springboard for more global action’ (228), describing empathy as a dyadic emotion that aligns 
the emotions (only) of people in a close personal relationship. Yet charitable organizations 
commonly arouse empathy through individual stories of suffering as a deliberate strategy for 
eliciting attention and responses to a wider cause.  Contrary to Prinz, empathy with a single 
‘other’ often leads to enhanced concern for many others.  Moreover, we often empathize with 
those who are not personally or physically near us, and with others quite different from 
ourselves (Gruen 55) – hence the perennial power of ‘human interest’ news-stories.   
Masto observes that rather than abandon empathy in moral life, the fitting response to 
empathic bias is ‘to work to become more aware of our biases and to be more deliberate in our 
empathizing and to mitigate the biases that are problematic’ (92). Indeed, Prinz’s stance is 
striking in its refusal to recognize that we can expand the scope of empathy when deficits are 
brought to our attention; his arguments assume that empathy’s range is rigidly fixed. This is to 
ignore historical evidence and activists’ ample experience of humans learning to extend empathy 
to different and distant others. In the last few centuries, slowly and haltingly, people have come 
to empathize with prisoners (subjected to barbaric forms of capital punishment), marginalized 
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minorities (killed by police without cause), children (once industrial slaves), and others both 
unlike and distant from themselves.  
Prinz comments that ‘efforts to expand our moral horizons by empathetic induction 
may make us more vulnerable to errors of allocation’ (231). This is his only mention of the 
possibility of people enlarging the scope of empathy, and he does not defend it. He may have in 
mind here issues of justice and fairness (where he thinks empathy can lead us astray), but 
empathy can certainly coexist with a moral concern for fairness. 
Prinz is more careful when he refers to empathy’s ‘limitations that make it ill-suited for 
some moral ends’ (230, my emphasis); perhaps here he is thinking of issues of fairness and 
justice. He acknowledges that emotions we feel upon attending to the feelings of others can be 
ways of drawing attention to our reasons for moral judgment – that is, to actual harms and 
benefits. Here, he says, empathy is playing ‘only an epistemic role in justification’ (225, my 
emphasis). But as Masto argues, this is an exceptionally important and often an essential role. 
Masto concludes that ‘empathy is a crucial component of our moral lives and commonly 
plays an important role in moral epistemology, moral motivation, and thus, moral action’ (91). I 
agree: personal experience and philosophical reflection reveal that ‘empathy is indispensable to 
our moral lives’ (92).  
 
Moral Laziness 
 
We generally think of laziness as an aversion to and avoidance of effort and work. We recognize 
that there are different types of laziness, and that a person may be industrious and energetic in 
one arena, but lazy in another. For example, some of us are physically lazy in the sense that we 
dislike and avoid physical exertions such as housework, physical labor, or exercise.  Others are 
mentally lazy in that they dislike and avoid intellectual efforts such as reading, writing, or 
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academic learning in general.  I would like to focus on a third phenomenon that I call moral 
laziness: aversion to and avoidance of moral efforts and exertion. 3 
What kinds of ‘efforts and exertion’ do the morally lazy avoid?  At least two activities 
seem salient: (a) efforts to arrive at a moral judgment about what one ought to do and (b) efforts 
to follow through in action one’s judgment about what one ought to do. A more specific failing 
is often involved in avoiding (a): avoiding the work of empathizing with those who are affected 
by a practice, which (as discussed above) can aid one in discerning what one ought to do. 
Empathic laziness can take at least three forms, corresponding to dimensions of empathy we 
noted earlier. One may avoid (i) imagining the mental state of another or taking the other’s 
perspective (the cognitive aspect of empathy), (ii) feeling the emotion appropriate or congruent 
with that perspective (the affective dimension of empathy), or (iii) acting on the impulse to help 
another that empathy typically arouses. By avoiding (i), of course, one can thereby avoid all 
three dimensions of empathy. 
 There is a wealth of evidence for these moral failings. Although it is not the only factor 
involved, laziness is present in those who possess a vague sense that animals are treated badly in 
food-production, but decline to sharpen that awareness into concrete and specific knowledge. 
When someone declines to read or watch films about the brutality of meat (and milk and egg) 
production, choosing willful ignorance over knowledge of what the animals experience, they 
exhibit moral laziness, as well as (often) a kind of cowardice. (Cowardice is present in that the 
readings and documentaries are painful to take in, and may indicate that a difficult and 
frightening change in one’s conduct is required.) Such agents would rather avoid the work of 
imagining the mental states of animals caused by their violent mistreatment – terror, confusion, 
grief, depression, pain – and thus avoid feeling the distress that accompanies imagining such 
                                                     
 
 
3  I mean to identify a failing distinct from weakness of will, although moral laziness and weakness of will (failing to 
do what is best according to one’s own reasoned judgment) may certainly overlap and compound one another. To 
explore how that is so, however, is beyond the scope of this essay. 
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suffering in another. By avoiding sources of information about how the animals are treated, they 
avoid having to imagine what it would be like to experience such brutal abuse. 
 Some who read about factory farming or watch relevant documentaries decline to come 
to full awareness of what the animals endure even as they learn of their abuse. They do not 
attempt to empathize with farmed animals – to imagine their mental states and feel congruent 
emotions – and thus do not allow the emergence of an accompanying impulse to help. Farmed 
animals’ expressions and behavior are harder to read than those of our animal companions, so 
that some can easily avoid empathizing with chickens, cows, and pigs. Chicks barely seem to 
change expression as they are debeaked, for instance, and then may simply stand in stunned 
silence. Without learning about chickens’ anatomy (the beak is full of nerves), one could 
observe a scene of debeaking, yet keep one’s empathy at bay. Likewise, calves who are branded, 
suffering third-degree burns, may simply stand still afterwards, appearing to have taken the 
injury in stride. If one does not know that as prey animals, cows benefit by not showing 
weakness or pain even when they are severely injured, one can avoid empathizing with the calf 
in the way we would empathize with a severely burned dog who writhed and howled in pain. 
 As many have observed, the more unlike us a suffering being is, the harder we must 
work to enter imaginatively into that being’s world. In trying to imagine farmed animals’ 
misery, it may be wise and natural for an agent to begin by imagining herself in the animal’s 
situation. Imagining oneself in the situation of being confined for years in a gestation crate, 
repeatedly giving birth to piglets who are taken away and never returned, can elicit in anyone 
(especially any woman) a nearly unbearable sense of claustrophobia, panic, and grief. As Coplan 
notes, this self-oriented perspective-taking may be an entrée into genuine (or better) empathy: 
imagining that one is a sow – an animal with a much larger body, a natural instinct to groom her 
young, and no expectation of future relief from a present discomfort – undergoing this torture. 
While we can never arrive at full knowledge of what it is like to be that pig, we are fully capable 
of initiating the motivated and controlled process of trying to attain that insight. While we can 
never completely succeed – while we may achieve only incomplete and fragmentary experiential 
‘glimpses’ of the misery of sensitive beings treated in this way – the ‘experienced insight’ that 
we can manage to attain through empathy is a far richer, deeper knowledge of pigs’ suffering 
than intellectual understanding by itself can bring. 
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 Many whose empathy is aroused when they witness the violence of factory farming 
quickly turn away from the impulse to help it awakens. This is so even when ‘helping’ may 
simply require withdrawing one’s support of the cruelty involved, by refusing to buy its 
products. ‘I could never be a vegetarian,’ many say, convincing themselves that this is a modest 
assessment of their own powers of self-discipline. But in taking this stance, they are giving up 
before they begin a potential project of self-initiated change. Perceiving it as almost impossibly 
hard, they decline to make the effort.  
 In all of these cases, people fail to empathize adequately with farmed animals, or to 
respond in action when they do empathize, because they do not try. In this they exhibit moral 
laziness.  
 
Why Does Laziness Matter? 
 
Many are puzzled that sloth appears on lists of the seven deadly sins. Sloth’s nearest equivalent 
today is laziness; but is laziness a vice at all?  Some regard it as ‘an amiable weakness,’ rather 
than a serious moral failing. Thus Evelyn Waugh remarks,  
The word ‘Sloth’ is seldom on modern lips. When used, it is a mildly facetious variant 
of ‘indolence,’ and indolence, surely, so far from being a deadly sin, is one of the most 
amiable of weaknesses. Most of the world’s troubles seem to come from people who are 
too busy. (57) 
To shed light on the moral significance of laziness, it will help to examine the precursor to our 
contemporary notion of the trait: the theological concept of sloth. In the following explication I 
follow the exceptionally helpful account of Rebecca DeYoung. 
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 The concept of sloth (acedia) has its roots in the 4th century, A.D. The Desert Fathers 
of Egypt4 meant by it a temptation to escape one’s commitment to the solitary religious life, due 
to both physical weariness (a result of their asceticism) and weariness with the spiritual life itself. 
Someone suffering acedia was thought to feel oppressed by the tedium and burdens of a spiritual 
calling, and to want to escape and enjoy entertainments in the city (Wenzel 10, 18). Later, 
when religious life took a more communal form, the concept changed to mean the temptation to 
escape participation in a religious community and its spiritual life. The term retained a sense of 
being oppressed by commitment to the religious life and was characterized as a kind of sorrow 
(tristitia). The inertia and tedium caused by this sorrow sapped one’s motivation to do one’s 
part in the community; thus a link with laziness as neglect of one’s duties  
(spiritual or physical) developed.  
In the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas reworked the meaning of sloth in his Summa 
Theologiae, both narrowing and broadening the concept. For Aquinas, acedia was specifically 
opposed to ‘charity,’ which for him meant perfect friendship with God, and thus was a 
particular kind of threat to spiritual life. At the same time, his conception of sloth broadened its 
potential application to any person (not just religious figures), since for him all humans were 
made to live in relationship with God (DeYoung 176). For Aquinas, the human telos for any 
person was to become like Christ: the exemplar of human perfection who lived in perfect 
communion with God. At its core, then, spiritual and moral life involved personal 
transformation to achieve that kind of relationship with the Creator. For Aquinas, virtues were 
                                                     
 
 
4 The desert fathers were ‘early Christian hermits whose practice of asceticism in the Egyptian desert, beginning in 
the 3rd century, formed the basis of Christian monasticism… Following the example of Jesus’ life of poverty, 
service, and self-denial, the early monks devoted themselves to vows of austerity, prayer, and work. Believers who 
chose to go into the desert as hermits were said to be answering the call of Christ: Jesus said to him, “If you would 
be perfect, go, sell what you possess and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and come, follow 
me” (Matthew 19:21).’ (Brittania.com, ‘Desert Fathers’)  
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dispositions that helped one approach the telos of friendship with God, and vices were personal 
habits that thwarted this transformation (178). 
Thus acedia meant much more than what we think of as laziness. It was an aversion not 
to physical or intellectual effort per se, but to the burdens of a relationship of love with God. It 
is appropriate that the Greek roots of ‘acedia’ meant ‘a lack of care,’ for acedia involved an 
unresponsiveness and aversion to the good of that potential relationship. The resentment, 
listlessness, sullenness, and apathy that accompanied sloth stemmed from seeing oneself stuck in 
a position one did not wholeheartedly embrace, but could not escape, since the potential 
relationship with God was given every human at birth (DeYoung 186). 
 Why would one feel aversion toward the relationship that constitutes one’s own telos 
and perfection? Aquinas’s answer resonates with our common understanding of sloth as aversion 
to effort, but also distinguishes it from mere laziness (DeYoung 187). He rejects the idea that we 
perceive friendship with God as essentially involving too much physical or bodily effort; for him, 
weariness or sluggishness is the effect of acedia, not the source of its sorrow. Physical inactivity, 
moreover, is not even a sure mark of the vice. The offspring vices stemming from it can include 
despair at having to live with an inescapable sorrow, or ‘flight,’ a restless escape into diversions. 
Thus Pascal noted that a frantically paced life may be as morally and spiritually suspect as a life of 
idleness: ‘restlessness, as well as laziness, can be a hallmark of acedia’  (DeYoung 191; Pascal 
nos. 139, 143, 146, 164, 171). 
 DeYoung’s interpretation is that for St. Thomas, acedia was resistance to the 
transformation of self required to achieve ‘friendship’ with God. It involved:    
sorrow at the thought of being in relationship with God because of … ‘the burdens of 
commitment.’ In fact, a symptom of acedia is that one perceives being in a relationship 
and maintaining it as burdens to be borne. Love and friendship are felt as making 
demands on us, and acedia resists them as such. (196) 
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DeYoung elaborates through the example of marriage: 
to be in [a loving] relationship will change me and cost me; it will require me to 
restructure my priorities; it may compromise my plans; it will add obligations; it will 
demand sacrifice; it will alter the pattern of my thoughts and desires and transform my 
vision of the world. Stagnating and staying the same is easier and safer. (198)  
In other words, love takes effort; and one who is slothful resists and neglects the effort involved 
in the ‘slow, daily, self-mortifying change’ required to maintain a loving relationship (202). 
Using the insights of Aquinas and DeYoung, we can develop an analogous and 
thoroughly secular conception of moral laziness that shows it to be a serious failing. While 
(Medieval) sloth was a rejection of and sorrow over the burdens and effort required to achieve a 
perfect relationship to God, moral laziness can be seen as sorrow over and rejection of the 
burdens and effort required to maintain a caring relationship to others – in particular, for our 
purposes, to nonhuman others.   
 When we focus on animals, it is easy to see why one might resist and avoid the demands 
that caring will bring. Farmed animals are brutally abused and killed to produce inessential 
products; so caring seems to require, at a minimum, that we stop supporting their abuse and 
slaughter with our money and consumer (especially eating) habits. But changing one’s diet is 
perceived as difficult, painful, daunting, and scary by someone steeped in a carnivorous culture. 
Even though it requires simply not buying and eating some things – omissions rather than 
actions, from one perspective – making that change is perceived as a severely challenging project 
and an onerous burden. Yet empathy with exploited animals points clearly to exactly that change 
as the least one can do if one cares. 
Self-transformation is frightening and hard. It is illuminating to re-read DeYoung’s 
diagnosis of why one might resist a loving relationship with God (or another human) and 
reframe it in terms of a caring relationship to other animals: 
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to be in [a caring] relationship will change me and cost me; it will require me to 
restructure my priorities; it may compromise my plans; it will add obligations; it will 
demand sacrifice; it will alter the pattern of my thoughts and desires and transform my 
vision of the world. Stagnating and staying the same is easier and safer … (198)  
Indeed. 
The element of being ‘stuck’ with a relationship further illuminates contemporary 
moral laziness. In the context of Aquinas’s metaphysical and religious outlook, the slothful are 
stuck in a position they don’t wholeheartedly endorse, didn’t ask for, and cannot escape. 
Similarly, in contemporary culture, someone who cares about animals is ‘stuck’ once she learns 
about factory farming. Once we know about it, we cannot un-know it; and we cannot escape 
making a decision (either tacitly or deliberately) about how to respond. We didn’t choose to live 
in a context of brutal violence to animals, but here we are. Sullenness and resentment (at the 
culture, at those who bring the facts to light, at the demands of caring for animals) in those who 
are stuck with having to choose what to do is in some ways understandable. Why must moral life 
be so hard; our context so fraught and so full of demands; our cultures so brutal; our 
enculturation so hard to transcend? 
Restlessness, feverish activity, or ‘busyness’ may characterize the morally lazy (as well 
as Aquinas’s slothful), and in fact can ensure continuation of  laziness; for one who is immersed 
in time- and energy-consuming projects (study, work, errands, service) can easily forget or lose 
track of the empathically stirred  impulse to help they may have felt at one time. A crowded 
schedule can help one forget about a moral undertaking even when it seems clearly required by 
one’s values.5  While they may not intend it, those who allow busyness to crowd out an 
                                                     
 
 
5 Although Pascal and Taylor are thinking in this context of frivolous diversions, DeYoung notes that ‘the busyness 
of doing ostensible works of charity [i.e., service to others] may itself also be a form of resistance to the demands of 
charity [in Aquinas’s sense of the term]’ (191). I would add that a person might keep herself busy at worthwhile and 
authentically valued activities as a means of escape. If one is attempting to evade an especially burdensome demand, 
she might immerse herself in worthwhile activities such as athletics, artistic creation, or study – just not the 
activities that would show commitment to the moral demand in question. 
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intentional move toward vegetarianism are guilty of ‘the cruelty of indifference’  (Taylor 122). 
Dante’s categorization in the Purgatory of sloth as ‘defective love’ (Taylor 16) seems apt in these 
cases, as well: while many meat-eaters claim to love animals, they suffer from defective love or 
caring. Like someone who allows a hectic schedule to crowd out caring for a spouse or friend, 
the morally lazy allow distractions to crowd out changing one’s habits for the sake of animals. 
Whether it shows itself in inertia or restless activity (or both, in different arenas), moral 
laziness is not an amiable failing, although some treat it as such when they make self-deprecating 
jokes about eating animals. The morally lazy recoil from and avoid the burdens of caring about 
animal others, even when caring requires only withdrawing active participation in abuse—i.e., 
withdrawing financial support from exploitive industries. Thus, moral laziness enables continued 
complicity in animal abuse. 
Beyond this wrongdoing, moral laziness also means the person never takes action to 
enact what she thought was a significant value in her life (or one that, had she been asked, she 
would have claimed to have): preventing the needless suffering of animals, or at least rejecting 
cruelty. Moral laziness thus undercuts integrity.  
Finally, moral laziness prevents the deeper transformation that can come from changing 
outward practices; for what we eat or don’t eat, day after day and year after year, profoundly 
shapes our worldview (Rachels 70). The morally lazy thus pass up an opportunity for self-
transformation and an expansion of their moral horizons.   
I have focused here on the laziness of failing to take action in light of suffering, but it is 
neglect of empathy – the perspective-taking that enables one to understand animals’ suffering 
and experience congruent emotions – that underlies that failing.   
 
Overcoming Moral Laziness 
 
It is my hope that coming to think in terms of laziness can motivate people to work harder at 
empathizing. After all, some Western societies are steeped in a Puritan heritage that places 
(even inordinate) value on effort and hard work, and that considers industriousness a virtue. 
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Most of us do not want to see ourselves as lazy (in the ordinary sense); when we describe 
ourselves as such it is a form of self-deprecation and a humble acknowledgement of weakness. 
 When we recognize moral laziness in ourselves, how can we act to correct it? When the 
failing is empathic laziness, how can we enhance our empathy?  When we witness such laziness 
in others, how can we aid them in achieving better empathy?   
As Jamison observes, empathy isn’t something that just happens to us. It (often) involves 
choices we make to pay attention and extend ourselves. It can be enhanced by things we can do 
– by deliberate exertion and a certain kind of work.  
A vast trove of practical advice about enhancing empathy can be found in self-help 
literature and philosophy, but none is more powerful than the idea of attention that Iris 
Murdoch elaborates, following the work of Simone Weil. Resisting a philosophical tradition that 
held morality to reside exclusively in outward behavior produced by an empty, choosing will, 
Murdoch focuses on inward dimensions of moral activity. She borrows the concept of attention 
from Simone Weil to express the idea of ‘a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual 
reality,’ which Murdoch regards as ‘the characteristic and proper mark of the active moral 
agent’ (33). She introduces the idea of attention or careful looking that we can actively direct, 
observing that ‘I can only act within the world I can see, in the moral sense of “see” which 
implies that clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral effort’ (36).   
Murdoch offers a well-known everyday example: A mother-in-law (M) does not care 
for her daughter-in-law (D) and thinks her unpolished, pert and familiar, undignified, and 
tiresomely juvenile. She could settle down with a sense of grievance and a rigid view that her 
son has married a silly, vulgar person. 
However, the M of the example is an intelligent and well-intentioned person, capable of 
self-criticism, capable of giving careful and just attention to an object which confronts 
her. M tells herself: ‘I am old-fashioned and conventional. I may be prejudiced and 
narrow-minded. I may be snobbish. I am certainly jealous. Let me look again’. (17) 
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Murdoch imagines:  
M observes D or at least reflects deliberately about D, until gradually her vision of D 
alters… D is discovered to be not vulgar but refreshingly simple, not undignified but 
spontaneous, not noisy but gay, not tiresomely juvenile but delightfully youthful, and  
so on. (17)  
With this simple but compelling example, Murdoch illustrates that ‘M’s moral acts are more 
than her overt behaviour shows’ (18). Even if there is no change in her behavior over time (D 
may even have died), it is clear that ‘M has in the interim been active, she has been doing 
something, something which we approve of, something which is somehow worth doing in itself’ 
(19). M does not passively accept her initial state of mind as something that merely happened to 
her, but in assessing and attempting to alter it makes it her responsibility (Taylor 7-8).  
Specifically, ‘M looks at D, she attends to D, she focuses her attention’ (Murdoch 22).  
This perspective enables Murdoch to highlight the idea of moral struggle and progress: 
M is engaged in an internal struggle… What M is … attempting to do is not just to see 
D accurately but to see her justly or lovingly… M’s activity is essentially something 
progressive, something infinitely perfectible... M is engaged in an endless task  (23). 
[That task is to attain] … a refined and honest perception of what is really the case, a 
patient and just discernment and exploration of what confronts one, which is the result 
not simply of opening one’s eyes but of a certain perfectly familiar kind of moral 
discipline… As moral agents we have to try to see justly, to overcome prejudice, to 
avoid temptation, to control and curb imagination, to direct reflection. (37, 39) 
Murdoch’s insight can help us understand a particular moral achievement: strengthening our 
empathy for exploited animals. As she notes, we have a measure of control over ‘the direction 
and focus’ of our vision (39). In fact, most of us (in affluent circumstances) have a great deal of 
control over what we can learn about animals and their abuse.  
To empathize better with animals who are relatively unfamiliar to us, we must acquire 
knowledge about the species in question. The more one learns about farmed animals’ cognitive 
and emotional capacities, instinctual drives and sources of frustration, body language and 
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methods of communication, the more one can imaginatively put oneself in their place as one 
observes their mistreatment.  
We know that empathy is strengthened by similarity, proximity, and familiarity; and 
weakened by their opposites. It is easier for us to empathize with those who are like us, near us, 
and familiar. Other animals are in many ways vastly different from us, unfamiliar to many, and 
far removed from everyday life (both physically and in our field of awareness); but one can 
overcome difficulties of unfamiliarity and difference by becoming more familiar with them. Lori 
Gruen captures the task well:  
What we need to do when we are trying to empathize with very different others is to 
understand as best we can what the world seems, feels, smells, and looks like from their 
situated position… This requires gaining as much knowledge of the ways the other lives 
as is possible… To do it well we have to try to understand the individual’s species-
typical behaviors and her individual personality over time. Very often this is not easy to 
do without expertise and observation. (66-67) 
Ethologists emphasize that there is no substitute for direct experience with other animals, to 
come to understand them. Barbara Smuts suggests that ‘for the heart to truly share another’s 
being it must be an embodied heart, prepared to encounter directly the embodied heart of 
another’ (108). By spending months in close proximity with chimpanzees and other animals, she 
came to know every one as ‘a highly distinctive individual’ (111), and this, of course, made 
greater caring for each one possible (Hamington 182). Thus Smuts urges ‘anyone with an 
interest in animal rights to open your heart to the animals around and find out for yourself what 
it’s like to befriend a nonhuman person’ (120). The best thing we can do to strengthen empathy 
for farmed animals, then, is to be with them, physically: spend time with cows and chickens, 
turkeys and pigs, observing closely and interacting with them.  
This is not an easy thing to manage for people in urban areas, but some organizations 
offer just such opportunities. Farm Sanctuary is an American organization dedicated to rescue, 
education, and advocacy for farmed animals. It was founded in 1986 with the mission ‘[t]o 
protect farm animals from cruelty, inspire change in the way society views and treats farm 
animals, and promote compassionate vegan living’ (farmsanctuary.org). Farm Sanctuary has 
rescued thousands of animals and cared for them at three sanctuaries in New York and 
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California. ‘At Farm Sanctuary, these animals are our friends, not our food. . . . [W]e share our 
lives with chickens, pigs, and other farm animals, and we know them as individuals,’ the website 
reports. A current campaign of Farm Sanctuary, The Someone Project, is dedicated to educating 
the public about farmed animals’ behavior, emotions, and intelligence. This involves sharing 
‘recent science regarding farm animal emotion, cognition, and social behavior,’ but also 
personal testimony: ‘At Farm Sanctuary, we share our lives with farm animals… And we can 
tell you from personal experience that farm animals have the same range of personalities and 
interests as cats and dogs’ (farmsanctuary.org).  
While they can rescue only a miniscule fraction of animals destined to become food in 
the United States, Farm Sanctuary regards the animals at its sanctuaries as ambassadors for the 
billions of individuals who are slaughtered each year on factory farms – unseen, unrecognized, 
and uncared for. The public is invited to come for tours where one can spend an hour or two 
meeting and interacting with rescued cows, pigs, chickens, turkeys, ducks, goats, and sheep. As 
the website explains, individual stories of the animals on site ‘give the public insight into the 
realities farm animals face in the modern factory farming industry, but also introduce us to 
inspiring individuals through their heartwarming tales’ of rescue (farmsanctuary.org). 
The guided tours provide thorough descriptions of factory farming’s treatment of 
farmed animals, but the most powerful dimension of these events is the opportunity for each 
person to see, touch, hear, and smell individual animals, up close and personal. Gigantic cows 
follow one around like dogs and lick one’s salty arms and legs with giant, sandpapery tongues. 
Pigs grunt and stretch with obvious pleasure as one rubs their bellies and chins. Turkeys spread 
their wings wide in encouragement when one pets them under their wings. Goats butt their 
heads and horns into one’s hand to be rubbed. The animals’ sentient awareness and their interest 
in each other and human visitors are fully manifest, unmistakably communicated in eye contact 
and expressive behavior.  
In this kind of setting one can practice the disciplined attentiveness that Murdoch 
describes; one can simply (but intentionally) pay attention to what the animals are like. That’s 
how we can best escape preconceptions and social norms about who is worthy of empathy; for as 
many people have discovered for themselves, farmed animals are not much different from their 
pets at home. Teachers know this to be a powerful and transformative experience: it often 
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brings students to a commitment to practical change (i.e., becoming vegetarian) that was absent 
before, even when they had accepted the rational arguments and watched the documentaries and 
judged that factory farming is brutal and wrong.    
As Maurice Hamington observes:  
if we allow ourselves to experience rich proximal and tactile interactions . . . with 
animals our appreciation for their nuanced existence will grow… Through relations 
with nonhuman bodies we can find our way to care for animals, and perhaps by 
imaginative extension, understand unfamiliar humans. (181-2) 
Hamington bases this thesis on the notion that ‘moral imagination improves with use. Like a 
physical skill, moral imagination develops when it is exercised and it can atrophy if it is not 
utilized’ (183). We can overcome the ‘empathetic challenge’ of imagining the experience of 
animals with a ‘different embodied existence, physical capacities, and brain structures’ through 
direct, tactile contact with them, in the way that we already do with our animal companions. 
For Hamington, ‘[p]roximity is crucial’ (183). Similarly, Marc Bekoff emphasizes that there is 
no substitute for ‘listening to’ other animals in seeking to understand them.  
Of course, not everyone has access to Farm Sanctuary rescues, small farms, or other 
sites where one can get close to individual animals. What then?  pattrice jones offers this:  
if you can’t listen to particular animals yourself, listen to those who have had the 
opportunity to do so. What do chimps want? Certainly, you can learn a lot about chimp 
ethology and then use your imagination. But you ought also find out what Jane Goodall 
or the folks at [a chimp sanctuary] think about that question. (102)  
Animal ethologists can also tell us all we need to know about the natures of farmed animals, 
with support from evolutionary biology, anatomy, fieldwork, and direct observation.   
Even if we are not in their actual presence, and even though we cannot come to know 
the personalities of individual farmed animals in their billions, we can exercise Murdoch’s 
‘perfectly familiar kind of moral discipline’ by trying to overcome prejudice (that chickens are 
insensate, that cows are dumb, that pigs are dirty), avoiding the temptation to see what we want 
to see (in order to eat what we want to eat), and directing our attention to the animals’ actual 
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natures as revealed by biology (they have sensitive nervous systems) and ethology (they find 
being crowded stressful).  
Lori Gruen adds that ‘the relationships we [have] with immediate others who [are] 
different could help us expand our perception to even more different others’ (77). Having 
experienced deep connections to animal companions, she notes that:  
drawing on the lessons we can learn about friendship, attraction, and respect in those 
relationships seemed like a good starting point [for enhancing empathy for other 
animals]… [T]he skills we learn in our closest relations can help us to make our more 
attenuated relationships better. (77) 
Thus activists often highlight the similarities between dogs and pigs, noting their intelligence, 
sociability, and capacity for affection. ‘How would you feel if your dog were treated that way?’ 
is an effective way to bring out the horror of gestation crates and other torments visited on pigs 
in factory farms. Thinking of a pig as a disguised dog is not ideal, for of course pigs have their 
own species-specific characteristics and are not just the same as dogs. But realizing the 
similarities can help some people get beyond their perceptions of pigs as stupid or unfeeling, and 
in this way can get people closer to seeing them as they really are. As Murdoch would put it, 
knowing about the similarities can help us to see pigs justly. 
 
Implications for Activists 
 
Activists aim to ignite self-examination, moral efforts, and change. The most powerful way to 
accomplish this is to inspire empathy for the victims of oppressive social practices, and the most 
powerful way to do that for animals is to show people both animals themselves and the suffering 
that humans cause them. Visual presentations of animal suffering are critical to effective 
activism, as has been often observed (Jenni 6). But we also need to make possible direct 
experience with animals on the part of those we would change. How to do this on a large scale 
without endangering or distressing the animals is not easy to imagine. Farm Sanctuary sites host 
volunteer days, Thanksgiving celebrations of turkeys, and other public events that invite people 
to observe and interact closely with farmed animals who have been rescued. But such events 
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reach only a few, and attract mostly those who already empathize well with animals. Perhaps 
virtual reality technology and experiences can take the place of such actual, physical interactions. 
  As in other social and moral arenas, forming personal relationships (with nonhuman 
animals) and experiencing the undisputed facts firsthand (about animals’ mental capacities, about 
the nature of factory farming) can bring about personal transformations, changes in worldview, 
and commitments to activism. Once one comes to know farmed animals, both in terms of 
species capacities and (especially) as individual beings, empathy comes naturally. It is also 
contagious in that people who come to appreciate chickens, cows, and other animals as they 
really are eagerly share their insights with family and friends. One of the beauties of good 
relationships is that friends help friends enhance their empathy. 
Finding ways of bringing animals to public awareness in a way that would enhance the 
work of empathy requires imagination and tenacity. I hope that animal protection groups that so 
effectively bring animal abuse to our vivid attention (Animals Australia, Mercy for Animals, 
Tribe of Heart, World Animal Protection) and groups that bring people in contact with animals 
(Farm Sanctuary and other rescues) will find ways of putting more people together with animals 
as an avenue to social change. In fact, it should be the mission of all who care about animals to 
find ways of doing that, to overcome moral laziness and enable the work of empathy.6    
                                                     
 
 
6 I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for Animal Studies Journal for extremely helpful suggestions on an earlier 
draft of this paper. 
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